

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 0108

EXDIS

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SUBJECT: ATLANTIC RELATIONS: NAC DISCUSSION OF JANUARY 9

SUMMARY: FRENCH PERMREP DE ROSE PRESENTED NAC, JANUARY9, WITH DETAILED RATIONALE FOR NEW FRENCH VERSIONS OF PARAS 3 AND 4 OF THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION. RUMSFELD THANKED FRENCH PERMREP AND POINTED TO CONTINUING U.S. INTEREST--WHICH NOW SEEMED TO BE SHARED BY WHOLE ALLIANCE--THAT APPROACH TO DECLARATION BE ON BASIS OF DEVELOPING A PROCLAMATION TO ALLIANCE PUBLIC OPINION OF WHAT IT IS THAT UNITES THE ALLIANCE, RATHER THAN THE HIGHLIGHTING OF SUBTLE DISTINCTIONS WHICH MIGHT DIVIDE IT. THIS WAS CLEARLY WHAT SECRETARY HAD IN MIND IN MAKING HIS ORIGINAL APPEAR AND WHICH HE REPEATED AS RECENTLY AS JANUARY 3. COUNCIL AGREED THAT ASYG FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS DAKTL WOULD CHAIR SMALL "THOUGHT GROUP" INCLUDING U.S. AND FRENCH PERMREPS, COUNCIL DEAN DE STAERCKE, AND FEW OTHERS AS NECESSARY TO WORK TOWARD AGREEMENT ON A COMMON DRAFT. END SUMMARY

1. IN OPENING JANUARY 9 COUNCIL DISCUSSION ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS, SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS EXPRESSED HOPE THAT THE DECLARATION COULD BE CONCLUDED AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE WITHOUT "EXCESSIVE PERFECTIONISM" OR TO MUCH INSISTENCE ON INSERTING "SACRED COWS" OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO SINGLE DELEGATIONS. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT NATO AND US-EC DRAFTS WERE RELATED, LUNS THOUGHT NATO EFFORT SHOULD MOVE FORWARD AT A BRISK PACE POSSIBLY SETTING AN EXAMPLE FOR THE NINE.

2. FRENCH PERMREP DE ROSE SAID FRENCH SUBMISSIONS ON PARAS
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3 AND 4 HAD BEEN TABLED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SUGGESTIONS OF OTHERS AS WELL AS THE U.S. PROPOSALS OF DECEMBER 5. THE NEW FRENCH PARA 3 INCORPORATED EARLIER VERSIONS OF FIRST SENTENCE OF THAT PARAGRAPH WHICH NO ONE HAD CONTESTED. IN RECASTING PARA 3 SENTENCE2, THE FRENCH HAD SOUGHT TO DELETE TWO IDEAS

WHICH THEY HAD CONSIDERED IMPORTANT BUT WHICH RISKED DANGEROUS INTERPRETATION. FIRST WAS ABOUT LACK OF EQUALITY AND DIFFERENCES IN VULNERABILITY BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN ALLIES. SINCE THE FRENCH HAD DELETED PREVIOUS REFERENCE TO DIFFERENCES IN VULNERABILITY, THEY COULD NOT PICK UP THE U.S. THOUGHT OF EQUAL VULNERABILITY FOR ALL. SECOND IDEA FRANCE HAD DELETED WAS REFERENCE TO "GREAT STABILITY" IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE THIS COULD FOSTER MISUNDERSTANDING THAT THE U.S. MIGHT NO REAMIN TOTALLY COMMITTED TO THE COMMON DEFENSE UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS OF STABILITY--A CONCEPT WHICH THE FRENCH HAD NOT INTENDED AT ALL. FRANCE WANTED TO GUARANTEE THAT ALL ALLIES WERE FULLY COMMITTED TO DEFENSE OF THE TREATY AREA UNDER ALL CONDITIONS OF POSSIBLE CONFLICT. THE FRENCH DID RETAIN U.S. LANGUAGE CITING AN "APPROXIMATE BALANCE" BUT FELT IT CONTINUED TO BE IMPORTANT TO CITE THE KNOWN FACT THAT EUROPEAN DEFENSE HAD DISTINCT CHARACTERISTICS. FRANCE HAD NO INTENTION IN PROPOSING THIS LANGUAGE AS EVIDENTLY EARLIER FRENCH VERSION HAD OF AROUSING FEARS THAT EUROPE WAS TO BE CONSIDERED A SPECIAL CASE. SUCH A CONCEPT RISKED CALLING INTO QUESTION THE PRINCIPLE THAT EACH OF THE ALLIANCE MEMBERS WAS EQUALLY INVOLVED IN DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE REGARDLESS OF HOW THAT PROBLEM IS OR COMES TO BE.

3. RE FRENCH PARA 4, FRENCH HAD USED THE WORD "EVOLUTION" TO LINK PARA 4 TO LAST SENTENCE OF PARA3. THE OTHER FRENCH CHANGES HAD BEEN MADE TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINTS THAT EARLIER FRENCH VERSIONS HAD CITED ONLY U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND NOT TROOPS AS IRREPLACEABLE TO ALLIANCE DEFENSE. FRANCE ACCEPTED, AND WANTED OTHERS TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THAT IT SEES AT PRESENT NO ALTERNATIVE EITHER TO U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES WHETHER STATIONED IN EUROPE OR THE UNITED STATES OR TO THE PRESENCE OF NORTH AMERICAN FORCES IN EUROPE. SPEAKING OF "NORTH AMERICAN" TROOPS ALSO RESPONDS TO CANADIAN COMMENTS.

4. ALTHOUGH PARA 5 WAS NOT COVERED IN FRENCH TEXTUAL REVISIONS, DE ROSE SAID FRANCE HAD PROBLEMS WITH REFERENCE IN THE U.S. VERSION TO "MEN UNDER ARMS." IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF EUROPEAN
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OPINION CAME TO BELIEVE THAT EUROPE WAS SUPPLYING ONLY FOOT SOLDIERS WHILE THE UNITED STATES SUPPLIED MOST OF THE EQUIPMENT AND SOPHISTICATED HARDWARE. DE ROSE THOUGHT A SUITABLE CHANGE MIGHT BE TO STATE "EUROPEAN FORCES OF THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES REPRESENT MORE THAN 80 PERCENT...."

5. SYG LUNS TERMS THE NEW FRENCH TEXT OF PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 4 A "BIG IMPROVEMENT" OVER ITS PREDECESSOR AND AGREED WITH CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY FRENCH AND OTHERS ABOUT CITING THE 90 PERCENT FIGURE AS THE U.S. HAD PROPOSED.

6. RUMSFELD THANKED DE ROSE FOR HIS SINCERE EFFORT TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF COMMENTS OF OTHERS AND FOR DE ROSE'S EXPLANATION OF THE FRENCH AMENDMENTS. HE THEN REFERRED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S JANUARY 3 PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH THE SECRETARY

DISCUSSED ATLANTIC DECLARATION AND SPOKE OF "GOOD PROGRESS." RUMSFELD EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO DISCUSS, ANALYZE AND AGREE ON THINGS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE A SUSTAINABLE BASIS FOR THE ALLIANCE, AND THEN TO PROCLAIM, OR DECLARE, TO OUR PUBLICS WHAT IT WAS THAT HAD BEEN AGREED TO IN WORKS THAT WOULD BE CLEAR. THE UNITED STATES WOULD APPRECIATE

THE COMMENTS OF OTHERS ON ITS DECEMBER 5 SUBMISSIONS. RUMSFELD SAID THE U.S. WAS FULLY PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE BUT ADDED THAT IT ALSO HAD SPECIFIC INTEREST.

7. HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO FIND A SATISFACTORY WAY OF EXPRESSING THE CONCEPT OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES PROVIDING 90 PERCENT OF THE MEN UNDER ARMS IN THE ALLIANCE. HE NOTED THAT THE U.S. ALSO THOUGHT OF THE EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION IN TERMS OF EQUIPMENT AND NOT JUST MANPOWER. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THIS PROBLEM OF WORDING COULD BE SOLVED.

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8. RUMSFELD SAID THERE WERE, HOWEVER, SOME THOUGHTS HE WOULD LIKE TO LAY OUT AT THIS TIME WHICH WERE RELATED TO WHAT DE ROSE HAD SAID. HE THOUGHT WE ALL COULD AGREE IF WE LOOKED AT DIFFERENT PIECES OF REAL ESTATE AND CHANGING WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY, THAT UNDER DIFFERING CIRCUMSTANCES THE CONDITIONS OF DEFENDING THOSE PIECES OF REAL ESTATE COULD BE DIFFERENT. WITHOUT DEBATING THAT, RUMSFELD THOUGHT WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES WHAT, IF ANYTHING, THERE WAS IN THIS POINT THAT WE WANTED TO PROCLAIM TO OUR PUBLICS. RATHER, HE SAID, WE SHOULD ASK OURSELVES--DESPITE WHATEVER DIFFERENCES THERE MAYBE--WHAT SHOULD BE THE CENTERPIECE OF THE NORTH AMERICAN-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP WHICH WE WISH TO DECLARE AND WHICH WOULD HELP TO MAKE THIS RELATIONSHIP SUSTAINABLE IN THE FUTURE? HE ASKED WHAT THERE WAS THAT WAS SO DESIRABLE ABOUT EMPHASIZING

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND EUROPE. WHAT WOULD BE THE ADVANTAGE IN THIS FOR THE ALLIANCE? RUMSFELD WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF THE

ALLIANCE HAD AGREED ON A SERIES OF NEW ACTIONS, UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES WE MIGHT WANT TO HIGHLIGHT THE CHANGES IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE WHY THESE NEW ACTIONS WERE NECESSARY. BUT OBVIOUSLY THAT IS

NOT THE CASE HERE, SINCE NO MAJOR NEW ACTIONS HAVE BEEN DECIDED UPON. IT SEEMED, TO RUMSFELD THAT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT WAS NOT TO PROCLAIM A CONCEPT OF DIFFERENTIATION WITH REGARD TO VARIOUS PIECES OF THE ALLIANCE'S REAL ESTATE; WHAT HE THOUGHT WAS IMPORTANT WAS TO TELL OUR PUBLICS THAT WE HAVE LOOKED AT THE RELATIONSHIP IN THE LIGHT OF CHANGES THAT AVE OCCURRED AND WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE INDIVISIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE. EVERYONE AGREES

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THAT THESE ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT PARAGRAPHS OF THE DECLARATION. WHAT DO WE WANT THEM TO SAY TO OUR PUBLICS, TO ENGAGE THEIR SUPPORT? RUMSFELD SAID THAT IF THERE WERE BETTER ANSWERS TO HIS QUESTION HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HEAR THEM, BUT HE THOUGHT WE SHOULD THINK CAREFULLY ABOUT WHAT THE CENTER-PEICE OF THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL NOT TO HAVE TO LIVE WITH THE CONSTANT BUFFETING OF PUBLIC OPINION REGARDING THE ALLIANCE; THE TASK IS TO TELL THE PUBLICS IN TERMS UNDERSTANDABLE TO THEM WHY THE ALLIANCE SHOULD EXIST IN THE COMING PERIOD AND ON WHAT BASIS.

9. SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS REPEATED HIS DOUBTS ABOUT THE WISDOM OF CITING SPECIFIC PERCENTAGES IN PARA 5. HE POINTED OUT FOR EXAMPLE THAT WHILE THE UNITED STATES SUPPLIED 38 PERCENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S AIR CAPABILITY, THE QUALITY OF U.S. AIRCRAT WAS IN MANY CASES SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER THAN THOSE OF THE EUROPEAN ALLIES. SIMILARLY, WHILE THE U.S. NAVY CONTRIBUTION WAS 47 PERCENT, IT INCLUDED

14 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS WHILE THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE MEMBERS HAD ONLY TWO. LUNS WANTED TO AVOID ANY RISKS THAT THE EUROPEANS MIGHT FEEL THAT THEY WERE MAKING A GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO ALLIANCE DEFENSE THAN WAS REALLY THE CASE.

10. RUMSFELD SAID THAT OUR SUGGESTED 90 PERCENT FIGURE HAD COME ONLY AS A CORRECTION TO PREVIOUS CITATIONS IN THE DRAFT OF 75 PERCENT. PERSONALLY HE THOUGHT NOTHING WAS LOST BY REMOVING THE PERCENTAGE REFERENCE OR USE OF ANY NUMBERS IN FAVOR OF SOMETHING LIKE CITATION OF A "PREPONDERANCE" OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OR SOME SIMILAR FORMULATION.

11. DE STAERCKE AGREED WITH LUNS THAT THERE WERE DANGES IN ATTEMPTING TO MAKE THE DOCUMENT "TOO PERFECT". HE RECALLED THAT THE MINISTERS HAD STATED THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE'S TREATMENT OF THE DECLARATION. DE STAERCKE FEARED THAT MAKING POINTS IN "TOO SPECTACULAR A WAY" MIGHT ENDANGER THE FRUITFUL COLLECTIVE WORK DONE TO DATE. DE STAERCKE RECOGNIZED THAT FURTHER PERFECTING AND POLISHING WAS REQUIRED AND SUGGESTED THAT DASTL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, APPLY HIS COMMON SENSE TO PREPARING A FINAL TEXT IN CONCERT WITH THE U.S. AND FRENCH

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PERMREPS.

12. DE STAERCKE FELT THAT THE ALLIANCE WAS REALLY TRYING FOR THE FIRST TIME TO DECLARE ITS STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE TO THE PUBLIC. HE SAID THAT SUCH AN ATTEMPT WAS USEFUL AND NOVEL, BUT ALSO DANGEROUS. THE DECLARATION MUST THEREFORE DEFINE A DIRECTION FOR THE ALLIANCE. HE SAID THERE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTE CLARITY ABOUT THE SOLIDARITY AND INDIVISIBILITY OF THE ALLIANCE WHICH ALL THE ALLIES HAVE RECOGNIZED. INDEED THIS IS SET FORTH AS THE OPENING SENTENCE OF THE DECLARATION. (COMMENT: "SOLIDARITY OF DESTINY" IN THE FRENCH TRANSLATES "COMMON DESTINY" IN THE ENGLISH. END COMMENT). ANYTHING CASTING DOUBT ON THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE DECLARATION SHOULD BE REMOVED. DE STAERCKE NOTED THAT TUMSFELD HAD STRESSED THAT THE DECLARATION SHOULD EMPHASIZE OUR UNITY AND SOLIDARITY

AND NOT OUR DIFFERENCES. DE STAERCKE SAID HE HAD NO SPECIFIC ANSWER ON HOW BEST TO DO THIS; PERHAPS ALLIANCE INDIVISIBILITY HAD NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY STRESSED. HE HOPED THAT WHEN PROMULGATED, THE DECLARATION WOULD BE ABLE TO PROVIDE A CREDIBLE AND COMPELLING RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUCH AS ONE HE HAD RECENTLY RECEIVED FROM A BELGIAN PARLIAMENTARIAN ON THE STATE OF THE ALLIANCE AND OF THE U.S.-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP.

13. TERMING THE DEAN'S PROCEDURAL SUGGESTION A WISE ONE, SYG LUNS AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR ASYG KASTL TO WORK WITH THE U.S. AND FRENCH DELEGATIONS IN DEVELOPING A JOINT TEXT SINCE THE ALLIES SEEMED CLOSE TO AGREEMENT.

14. RUMSFELD SAID HE WOULD BE PLEASED TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR DE ROSE AND ASYG KASTL AND WITH ANY OTHER DELEGATIONS THAT MIGHT WANT TO PARTICIPATE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT EXPANDING THE CIRCLE WOULD GIVE RISE TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF DRAFTING IN A FORMAL ATMOSPHERE, BUT CERTAINLY ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED FROM HOPING TO DEVELOP LANGUAGE ON POINTS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THEM.

15. LUNS SUGGESTED THAT THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE TAKEN CARE OF BY HAVING COUNCIL DEAN DE STAERCKE PARTICIPATE ON BEHALF OF THE OTHER ALLIES.

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16. REFERRING AGAIN TO AMBASSADOR DE ROSE'S REMARKS RELATING TO PARAGRAPH 3, RUMSFELD SAID THAT HE COULD IMAGINE WHAT SOME ALLIES MIGHT WISH TO SAY AS THEY DISCUSS THE DECLARATION FURTHER. SOME MIGHT ASK WHETHER THE IDEA OF "NEAR EQUILIBRIUM" BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR, WHICH DOES NOT EXTEND TO EUROPE, IN THE FRENCH TEXT, WOULD MEAN THAT DETERRENCE DID NOT EXTEND TO THE EUROPEAN ALLIES. SOME MIGHT ASK WHETHER IT WAS WISE TO PROCLAIM THAT KIND OF IDEA. ANOTHER WAY TO LOOK AT IT MIGHT--WITH THE ALLIANCE DEFINED AS INDIVISIBLE--INDICATE THAT THE U.S. SOVIET "NEAR EQUILIBRIUM, AND THEREFORE THE DETERRENT APPLIED TO EUROPE AS WELL AS TO THE U.S. IN TERMS OF DEFENSE, IF DETERRENCE SHOULD FAIL THE SITUATION COULD BE VERY DIFFERENT IN DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE TREATY AREA. THE SITUATION ON THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN FLANKS MIGHT BE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THAT IN THE CENTER. IN OTHER WORDS, THE IDEA THAT ALL OF EUROPE WOULD BE IN THE SAME SITUATION WAS NOT NECESSARILY TRUE AND SO ONE MIGHT ASK WHETHER THE DIFFERENTIATION WHICH THE FRENCH MADE BETWEEN THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE AND OF NORTH AMERICA WAS A USEFUL ONE. CONCLUDING, RUMSFELD SAID HE THOUGHT THE ALLIES SHOULD LOOK AT THE CIRCUMSTANCES APPLYING BOTH IN THE CASE OF DETERRENCE AND THE CASE OF DEFENSE IF DETERRENCE FAILED, AND IN HIS VIEW THE FRENCH LANGUAGE COULD WEAKEN THE DEFENSE.

17. DE STAERCKE RECOGNIZED THAT THE COUNCIL MUST BE FULLY INVOLVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEXT. THE IMMEDIATE DRAFTING EFFORT, HOWEVER, COULD PERHAPS BEST BE UNDERTAKEN BY A SMALL "COMITTEE OF THOUGHT" WHICH WOULD PREPARE SUCCESSIVE DRAFTS AS REQUIRED AND PRESENT THEM TO THE COUNCIL.

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18. DE ROSE THOUGHT RUMSFELD HAD PUT THE RIGHT QUESTIONS IN HELPING THE ALLIES GET TO THE BOTTOM OF THE ISSUES. HE FULLY AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR PUBLIC IMPACT TO STRESS THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, AS THE FRENCH HAD ATTEMPTED TO DO IN THEIR DRAFT. NEITHER THE FRENCH NOR ANY OF THE OTHER ALLIES, SAID DE ROSE, HAD ANY QUESTION ABOUT THE NEED FOR RENEWED EMPHASIS ON ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. IT WAS ALSO IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT THE DECLARATION DEAL WITH NEW DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE GENERATED QUESTIONS IN THE PUBLIC'S MIND IN HIS COUNTRY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ALLIANCE PUBLIC OPINION MUST BE TOLD WHETHER THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION CHANGES ANYTHING FOR THE ALLIANCE. WHAT IS NEW IS THE BALANCE. DOES THIS BALANCE CHANGE THINGS FOR THE ALLIANCE, FOR PART OF THE ALLIANCE, FOR EUROPE? THIS IS WHAT EUROPEANS ARE ASKING? WE MUST ANSWER THIS QUESTION. OUR ANSWER IS, THIS CHANGES SOME THINGS BUT NOT THE ESSENTIAL THING. THE SPECIFIC CHARACTER OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE PROBLEM

HAD BECOME MORE DISTINCT, BUT THIS CHANGED NOTHING IN THE PREVIOUS REQUIREMENT FOR A U.S. COMMITMENT TO EUROPE AND A EUROPEAN CONTRIBUTION TO ITS OWN DEFENSE. FRANCE WOULD NOT INSIST ON THINGS THAT SEPARATE THE ALLIANCE BUT DID WANT TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS, HOWEVER SLIGHT, ABOUT SUCH DISTINGUISHING DIFFERENCES AS MILITARY FORCES. DE ROSE NOTED THAT NO DRAFTING ARTIFICE WOULD OVERCOME A BASIC DISAGREEMENT ON PRINCIPLES. DE ROSE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT AFTER WORKING TOGETHER OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS IN AN ATTEMPT TO RESPOND TO THE SECRETARY'S APRIL APPEAR, HE FELT THE ALLIES COULD AGREE ON BASIC PRINCIPLES.

19. FRG PERMREP (DRAPF) WHILE APPROVING THE CREATION OF THE "THOUGHT GROUP", SAID HE WOULD RESERVE FRG'S RIGHT IN FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES. LUNS RESPONDED THAT THAT GOES WITHOUT SAYING.

20. RUMSFELD THOUGHT DE STAERCKE'S SUGGESTION ABOUT THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE DECLARATION WHICH REFERS TO THE CONTINUING SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, WAS USEFUL AND AGREED THAT ALL SUBSEQUENT LANGUAGE SHOULD BE CHECKED

TO ENSURE THAT IT SUPPORTS THAT STATEMENT. HE ALSO WELCOMED THE ABOVE STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DE ROSE SINCE IT DIRECTLY MET THE SUGGESTION THAT THE DECLARATION BE LOOKED AT

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FROM THE STANDPOINT OF HOW IT MIGHT BEST MEET THE NEEDS OF OUR RESPECTIVE PUBLIC OPINION. RUMSFELD FELT THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD REACH

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21. GREEK PERMREP (CHORAFAS) AGREED TO THE CREATION OF A COMMITTEE COMPOSED OF ASYG KASTL AND THE U.S. AND FRENCH PERMREPS AND SOME OTHERS. HE SAID IT WAS VITAL THAT THE DECLARATION NOT SUPPORT EXISTING VOICES IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION WHICH CLAIM THAT THE PROBLEMS OF U.S. AND EUROPEAN DEFENSE ARE DIFFERENT AND THAT NORTH AMERICA IS SAFE WHILE EUROPE BEARS THE GREATEST RISK.

22. IN HIS SUMMARY, LUNS OBSERVED THAT SINCE NO OBJECTIONS HAD BEEN STATED, THE COUNCIL APPROVED THE SETTING UP OF A COMMITTEE TO MOVE AHEAD IN PREPARING THE DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT ASYG KASTL WOULD BE MAKING SOUNDINGS OF VARIOUS DELEGATIONS WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

RUMSFELD

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